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Abstract
This paper addresses three issues on the conduct of monetary policy in
open economies on the basis of a two-country model with Calvo-type sticky
prices. Is the isomorphism of the optimal policy problems between closed and
open economies robust to whether the foreign country is bu®eted by cost-push
shocks? How can we obtain a linear quadratic approximation that replicates
the key results of the original optimal policy problem, especially when there
is an analytical solution to the original problem in the presence of initial price
dispersion? What are optimal policy recommendations for the central banks in
open economies when both cost-push shock and initial price dispersion exist?
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Much of the recent literature in open macroeconomics has addressed the issue
of how to conduct monetary policy in open economy models that include im-
perfect competition and nominal rigidities as mechanisms for non-neutralities
of monetary policies. A very restricted set of examples include Benigno and
Benigno (2004), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001, 2003) and Gali and Monacelli
(2005). Furthermore, the recent welfare analysis of the monetary policy builds
on linear-quadratic approximations to micro-founded optimization models with
nominal rigidities, following Clarida, Gali, Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003).
We focus on the following three issues on the optimal monetary policy for
open economies based using a two-country model with Calvo-type sticky prices.
First, we ask if the isomorphism of the optimal policy problems between closed
and open economies can be preserved when the foreign country is subject to
cost-push shocks. Second, we derive a linear quadratic approximation that
replicates the key results of the original optimal policy problem, especially al-
lowing for initial price dispersion. Third, we characterize the optimal policy
recommendations for the central banks in open economies when both cost-push
shocks and initial price dispersion exist.
In order to address these issues, our model maintains a simple structure
which inherits from much of the recent open-economy literature|such as unit
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, complete asset
market, and price setting in terms of producers' currency. The key di®erence
from the existing literature, however, is that we explicitly allow for dynamic
movements of relative price distortion responding to in°ation and initial price
dispersion, as done in a closed-economy setting by Yun (2005).
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we demonstrate that the
optimal monetary policy requires the home country to respond to output gaps
of the foreign country, which can arise from foreign cost-push shocks. This is
in contrast to Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001, 2003), which argues for the iso-
morphism of the optimal policy problems between closed and open economies.
The reason for such a di®erence is that their analysis exploits the assumption
that cost-push shocks exist only in the home country, while our analysis permit
cost-push shocks in both of the home and foreign countries.
The second issue we analyze is how one can formulate a linear-quadratic
problem that replicate the optimal policy derived from the original economy
1without any approximations. In particular, given the set-up of the model an-
alyzed above, optimal monetary policy implies that the optimal producer's
price in°ation rate is set to the growth rate of relative price distortion in a
model with initial price dispersion. We derive this result from the original
economy under the assumption that cost-push shocks do not exist in both of
home and foreign countries. Since Yun (2005) shows that the same is true in
a closed economy, our result implies that such characterization of the optimal
in°ation rate remains true for open and closed economies. We then present a
linear-quadratic approximation to the original optimal policy problem, which
preserves the key properties of the original analytic solution. In order to do so,
we follow the approach taken in Woodford (2003), even though normalization
for the measure of the relative price distortion di®ers from that of the conven-
tional approximation.
Finally, we solve the linear quadratic optimization problem for the case
where both of the initial relative price distortion and cost-push shock exist at
home and aborad. In particular, with appropriately chosen short-run target
levels of output gap and in°ation, we present a generalized version of the op-
timal relationships between output gap and in°ation rate analyzed in Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (1999, 2001, 2002). Speci¯cally, we demonstrate that|when
the short-run target levels of output and in°ation rate are de¯ned as the op-
timal values under the optimal policy in the absence of cost-push shocks|the
deviations of output gap and in°ation rate from their short-run targets mimic
the optimal policy rules discussed in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999, 2001,
2002).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we revisit models
of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001, 2002) to explore consequences of cost-push
shocks in home and foreign countries. In section 3, we derive a law of motion
for a measure of relative price distortion under the Calvo pricing. We then
present a linear quadratic optimization problem whose solution is equivalent
to minimizing relative price distortion in each period. In section 4, we discuss
the optimal policy problems for the case where both of the initial relative price
distortion and cost-push shock exist at home and abroad. Section 5 concludes.
The appendix provides the details on the economy and the linear-quadratic
approximations.
22 Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001, 2002) Revisited
We begin by brie°y discussing the optimal policy problem of Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (2001, 2002). They argue that the optimal monetary policy problem
facing the central bank in an open economy is basically the same as that of a
closed economy, though its parameters may be di®erent. Speci¯cally, Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (2001, 2002) showed that the quadratic loss-function of the













while the Phillips curve can be written as
¼t = ·xt + ut + ¯Et[¼t+1]: (2.2)
Here, ¼t, xt, and ut are the domestic in°ation rate, the output gap, and the
cost-push shock of the home country. The parameters in the optimization





(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ®¯)(¾(1 ¡ °) + ° + º)
®
; (2.3)
where ² is the demand elasticity of ¯rms, ° is the population share of the foreign
country, ¾ is the inverse of elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, º is the
inverse of elasticity of labor supply, and ® is the fraction of ¯rms that do not
change their previous period's prices.1
Having described the optimal policy problem of Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(2001, 2002), we now include cost-push shocks of the foreign country into their
model.2 The preference at period 0 of the representative household in the home
1The Phillips curve and loss function analyzed in this paper may have the same functional
forms as those of closed economies. However, coe±cients of in°ation and output gap in
these functions di®er from those of closed economies. The Phillips curve equations in the
present section are derived from log-linearization of pricing equations. In particular, the
terms associated with relative price distortion are not included in the Phillips curve equation,
because it is assumed that relative price distortion does not exist. In this section, we also
follows this assumption in order to focus on the role of cost-push shocks. However, the
Phillips curve equation in the next section allows for the presence of relative price distortion.
2Appendix B includes detailed derivation of the preference and the Phillips curve in this
case.





















° + º + ¾(1 ¡ °)
(2.5)
The Phillips curve equation can be written as
¼t = ·xt ¡ ¹ ·x
¤
t + ut + ¯Et[¼t+1]; (2.6)
where x¤
t denote the output gap of the foreign country and ¹ · is de¯ned as
¹ · =
°(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ®¯)(1 ¡ ¾)
®
: (2.7)
Compared with the optimal policy problem of Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(2001, 2002), the di®erence is that the foreign output gap, x¤
t, is included in
both our preference and Phillips curve. It may be worthwhile to discuss the rea-
son why this di®erence takes place. First, it should be noted that zero in°ation
policy can achieve the ¯rst-best allocation if neither initial price dispersion
at home nor cost-push shock in the foreign country exists and ¯scal policy
eliminates the distortion associated with monopolistic competition. This has
been emphasized in recent literature such as Goodfriend and King (1997) and
Woodford (2003). The same is true for open economies analyzed in this paper.
Second, output gap is de¯ned as the deviation of output from its ¯rst-best level.
Hence, the presence of cost-push shocks is important to determine whether or
not the optimal policy leads to a zero output gap. For example, the optimal
policy leads to x¤
t = 0 without initial price dispersion or cost-push shock in the
foreign country. However, the optimal policy in the foreign country leads to
x¤
t 6= 0 with the cost-push shocks. This is the key di®erence from Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (2001, 2002).
But it also should be noted that Á = 0 when we have a unit elasticity of
inter-temporal substitution. Besides, we can see that when Á = 0, the two loss
functions (2.1) and (2.4) turn out to be the same regardless of the value of
x¤
t. As a result, so long as either households have a logarithmic utility func-
tion for consumption or cost-push shocks do not exist in the foreign country,
4the optimal policy problem facing the central banks in open economies is to
minimize (2.1) subject to (2.2). In this case, the optimal policy problem for an
open economy is isomorphic to that of a closed economy, as argued in Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (2001, 2002). However, when foreign cost-push shocks cause
nonzero foreign output gap, the appropriate loss function for the central bank
is the one speci¯ed in (2.4). For this reason, we maintain throughout this sec-
tion the assumption that cost-push shocks exist home and abroad.
In order to pursue the optimal policy, the central bank minimizes the loss
function (2.4) subject to the Philips curve equation (2.6). When commitment
is possible, the ¯rst-order conditions of the optimal policy problem can be
summarized as follows:











Therefore, the optimal policy has the change in output gap adjust not only
to the deviations of in°ation from target but also to the change of the foreign
output gap.3 When the foreign output gap is assumed to be zero as in Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (2001, 2002), the optimal policy rule that is implied by the
¯rst-order conditions is given by




Comparing (2.8) with (2.9), we can see that the presence of cost-push shocks in
the foreign country along with non-unit elasticity of inter-temporal substitution
would break an isomorphism between optimal policy problems in open and
closed economies. This is in contrast to Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001, 2002).
3 Re¯nement of optimal policy problems in open economies with
relative price distortion
In the previous section, we have discussed consequences of symmetric presence
of cost-push shocks in home and foreign country on the optimal policy. In this
section, however, we ignore cost-push shocks in both of home and foreign coun-
tries. This is to focus on the role of relative price distortion in characterizing
the optimal monetary policies in open economies. We begin by considering





5the law of motion for the relative price distortion under Calvo pricing and then
move on to a linear quadratic problem. The measure of relative price distortion
shows up in our quadratic loss function.
3.1 Analytic solution to the original optimal policy problem with
relative price distortion under the Calvo pricing
There are two types of domestic goods: intermediate goods and ¯nal goods.
Domestic intermediate goods are sold only to domestic ¯rms producing ¯nal
goods, while domestic ¯nal goods can be purchased by both domestic and
foreign households. In addition, the markets for ¯nal goods are perfectly com-
petitive and the number of ¯nal goods producers in each country equals its
population size. Moreover, each intermediate goods ¯rm z produces a type z
of intermediate goods indexed in a unit interval [0, 1] and sets its price as a
monopolistic competitor.
Let Yt denote the output level at period t of a ¯nal goods producer. We then









where ² > 1 and Yt(z) denotes the demand of a ¯nal goods producer for an
intermediate goods z. Furthermore, since each ¯nal goods producer minimizes
its cost of producing Yt, taking intermediate goods prices as given, the demand






where Pt(z) denotes the price at period t of the intermediate goods z, and Pt
denotes the price index of the domestic intermediate goods. Here, the price








We also de¯ne the relative price distortion as the part of output that is foregone
because of price dispersion, following Goodfriend and King (1997), Woodford
6(2003), and Yun (2005). The relative price distortion at period t, denoted by









Following Calvo (1983), we assume that a fraction of intermediate goods
producers, 1 ¡ ®, are allowed to choose a new optimal price at period t, P ?
t ,
in each period t = 0, 1, ¢¢¢, 1. In addition, the other fraction of ¯rms do
not change their previous prices. Then, combining (3.3) with (3.4), we see
that under the Calvo-type staggered price-setting, our measure of relative price
distortion speci¯ed above turns out to be










where ¦t is the ratio of price-levels at period t and t ¡ 1. It then follows from
equation (3.5) that the current level of relative price distortion depends on
the current rate of the producer price index in°ation and the previous level of
relative price distortion.4
Having described the law of motion for relative price distortion, we now
explain how the relative price distortion works in the aggregate production
relation. Each ¯rm z employs labor to produce its product z using a linear
production function:
Yt(z) = AtNt(z); (3.6)
where Nt(z) is the number of hours hired by ¯rm z and Yt(z) denotes the
output level of the domestic ¯rm z. Next, substituting (3.2) into (3.6) and then
aggregating the resulting equation linearly, the aggregate production function





4See Woodford (2003) for a detailed discussion on how one can derive a quadratic loss
function from the utility function of the household, in which a measure of price dispersion
in the Calvo model is de¯ned as a cross-section variance of logarithms of individual prices.
Besides, see Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2004) for an explicit discussion on how to derive a




0 Nt(z)dz. It is obvious from equation (3.7) that a rise in the
relative price distortion increases the part of output that is foregone given the
amount of hours worked and the level of technology. Each period, therefore,
we seek an in°ation rate that minimizes the measure of relative price distortion













Substituting the ¯rst-order condition of this minimization problem into the law
of motion for relative price distortion, we have the following relation between





Taking logarithm to both sides of (3.9), we have
¼t = ±t ¡ ±t¡1: (3.10)
where ¼t = logPt - logPt¡1 and ±t = log¢t.
3.2 Linear quadratic approximation in the presence of relative
price distortion
Now that we have shown that minimizing relative price distortion at period t
requires the in°ation rate to equal the logarithmic di®erence of relative price
distortion at periods t and t¡1, we move on to another interesting ¯nding that
the same solution can be obtained by minimizing a quadratic loss function,
which is derived from the utility function of the household on the basis of the
measure of relative price distortion. The solution of this minimization problem
will be shown to be consistent with the Phillips curve in a decentralized setting.
3.2.1 Optimal monetary policy in the presence of relative price dis-
tortion
It is shown in appendix B that when we use the measure of relative price
distortion (3.5), the preference at period 0 of the representative household in

















txt + µ±txt]; (3.11)






° + º + ¾(1 ¡ °)
: (3.12)
It is now worth discussing the reason why cross-products of relative price dis-
tortion with in°ation and output gap show up in the loss function speci¯ed
above. The relative price distortion terms are included in the loss function
because of a di®erent order approximation to the relative price distortion than
the one used in Woodford (2003). It is shown in appendix B that the order
of approximation residual is O(jj±;»jj3) in our paper while it is O(jj±
1
2;»jj3) in
Woodford (2003), where jj»jj denotes a bound on the amplitude of exogenous
shocks.
In order to replicate the solution to the minimization problem of relative
price distortion speci¯ed in the previous section, we consider a static optimiza-
tion problem, which minimizes the quadratic loss function speci¯ed in (3.11).
The ¯rst-order condition for output gap is
!xt ¡ Áx
¤
t + µ±t = 0: (3.13)





Meanwhile, when we make the ¯rst-order approximation to the measure of
relative price distortion (3.5) around the steady state with constant prices, we
have a deterministic AR(1) process of the form:
±t = ®±t¡1: (3.15)
Then, substituting (3.15) into (3.14) leads to the following equation:
¼t = ±t ¡ ±t¡1: (3.16)
The optimal in°ation rate at period t therefore turns out to be the logarithmic
di®erence of relative price distortions at period t and t ¡ 1. Comparing (3.16)
9with (3.10), we can see that a static minimization of the loss function (3.11)
leads to the rate of in°ation at which relative price distortions are minimized
over time.
To the extent that there is perfect exchange rate pass-through and ¯scal
policy can eliminate the distortion associated with monopolistic competition
and openness, we ¯nd that the optimal in°ation rate of the producer's price
index equals the logarithmic change of relative price distortions. In closed
economy, the optimal in°ation rate equals the logarithmic change of relative
price distortions as shown in Yun (2005). Thus, in the absence of cost-push
shocks, characterization of optimal in°ation rates in open and closed economies
are isomorphic, in the sense that optimal in°ation rates are expressed in terms
of relative price distortion. However, it does not mean that optimal policy
problems between closed and open economies are isomorphic, which can be
easily con¯rmed by the loss function (3.11).
3.2.2 Decentralization
It will be shown that when the central bank has a loss function of the form
(3.11), the Phillips curve equation is not a binding constraint, which in turn
implies that the static minimization of the loss function (3.11) that ignores the
Phillips curve equation is legitimate.
We begin with an equilibrium relation between the real marginal cost and
output gap, which holds as results of decentralized decision-makings. We then
substitute the optimal conditions for output gap and in°ation rate into this
equation so as to ¯nd the size of the real marginal cost, which supports the
optimal output gap and in°ation rate as equilibrium outcomes. First, putting
the e±ciency condition for labor supply, zero trade balance condition, and the
aggregate production function together, we can see that the real marginal cost
can be written as
^ mct ¡ ^ pct = (° + º + ¾(1 ¡ °))xt ¡ (1 ¡ ¾)°x
¤
t + º±t; (3.17)
where ^ mct is the log-deviation of the real marginal cost from its steady state
value and ^ pct is the log-deviation of the ratio of the producer price index to
the consumer price index from its steady state value. Meanwhile, given the
de¯nitions of parameters Á, !, and µ, we can rewrite the optimal condition for
10output gap speci¯ed in (3.13) as follows:
(° + º + ¾(1 ¡ °))xt ¡ (1 ¡ ¾)°x
¤
t + (1 + º)±t = 0: (3.18)
Comparing (3.17) with (3.18), we can see that attaining equation (3.13) as an
equilibrium condition in a decentralized economy requires the real marginal
cost to satisfy
^ mct ¡ ^ pct = ¡±t: (3.19)
Furthermore, when we log-linearize pricing equations of ¯rms and then com-
bine the resulting equations, the Phillips curve equation can be written as
¼t =
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ®¯)
®
(^ mct ¡ ^ pct) + ¯Et[¼t+1]: (3.20)
Then, we can see that substituting (3.15) and (3.16) into (3.20) leads to the
same condition as speci¯ed in (3.19). This means that the optimal conditions
for in°ation and output gap (3.13) and (3.16) together with (3.15) satisfy the
Phillips curve equation. Besides, recall that the optimal conditions for in°ation
and output gap (3.13) and (3.16) are derived from a planning problem that
ignores the Phillips curve equation as a constraint. As a result, we can see that
when the central bank has a loss function of the form (3.11), the Phillips curve
equation is not a binding constraint.
4 Optimal monetary policy in the presence of relative price dis-
tortion and cost-push shock
In this section, we discuss the optimal monetary policy problems for the case
where home and foreign countries have e®ects of foreign output gaps and rel-
ative price distortion. In the previous section, we have derived a quadratic
loss function in the presence of relative price distortion. Since output gap of
the foreign country can arise either because of cost-push shocks or because of
relative price distortion or both, we can see that even when both of cost-push
shocks and relative price distortion exist, the loss function of the central bank
is still the same as the one with relative price distortion alone. But once cost-
push shocks are included, we should take into account the short-run trade-o®
between in°ation rate and output, which was absent in the previous section. In
particular, the solution to the minimization problem analyzed in the previous
11section may not be achievable as a result of decentralized decision-makings in
the face of cost-push shocks. Thus, when cost-push shocks are included, the
Phillips curve equation becomes a constraint for the optimal policy problem.

















txt + µ±txt]; (4.1)
subject to the following Phillips curve equation:
¼t = ·xt ¡ ¹ ·x
¤
t + ¹±t + ut + ¯Et[¼t+1]; (4.2)





With commitment possible, the ¯rst-order conditions of the optimal policy




±t + ¸t ¡ ¸t¡1 = 0; (4.4)
!xt ¡ Áx
¤
t + µ±t ¡ ·¸t = 0; (4.5)
where ¸t is the Lagrange multiplier to the Phillips curve equation. Combining
(4.4) with (4.5), the optimal relationship between output gap and in°ation rate
under commitment can be written as
xt ¡ ¹ xt ¡ (xt¡1 ¡ ¹ xt¡1) = ¡
·
!
(¼t ¡ ¹ ¼t); (4.6)
Here, ¹ ¼t and ¹ xt can be interpreted as the optimal in°ation rate and output gap
in the absence of cost-push shocks because ¹ xt and ¹ ¼t are de¯ned as













It follows from equation (4.6) that the optimal output gap and in°ation rate
deviate from ¹ xt and ¹ ¼t because of the presence of cost-push shocks. Besides,
¹ xt and ¹ ¼t can be achieved under the optimal policy in the absence of cost-push
12shocks but they can not be attained in the presence of cost-push shocks. In
this sense, we interpret ¹ xt and ¹ ¼t as the short-run optimal targets for output
gap and in°ation rate. Given this interpretation, the optimal policy rule (4.6)
has the change in deviations of output gap from its optimal level adjusts to the
deviation of producer's price in°ation from its optimal level.5
In sum, our analysis has illustrated that even when relative price distortion
and cost-push shock exist home and abroad, the optimal policy rules in open
economies are not isomorphic to those in closed economies. For example, it is
noteworthy that ¹ xt depends on the output gap of the foreign country. Hence,
when the home country follows the optimal policy rule speci¯ed in (4.6), a
change in the output gap of the foreign country generates a change in the
output gap of the home country.
But it should be noted that they are very similar. Speci¯cally, our policy
rules discussed above mimic those of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999, 2001,
2002), except that ¹ xt and ¹ ¼t are included. In particular, it is noteworthy
that e®ects of openness and relative price distortion on optimal policy rules
are summarized by the inclusion of short-run targets such as ¹ xt and ¹ ¼t in the
optimal policy rules. As a result, whether or not the optimal policy rules in
closed and open economies are isomorphic depends on the existence of ¹ xt and
¹ ¼t in the optimal policy rules for open economies.
5 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that, while ignoring relative price distortion, the as-
sumption on the existence of cost-push shocks in the foreign country can play
an important role in isomorphism of optimal policy rules between open and
closed economies. In order to for the isomorphism to hold, it is necessary to as-
sume that the home country is subject to cost-push shocks whereas the foreign
country is not and the foreign output gap is zero. However, we illustrate that
when home and foreign countries are subject to cost-push shocks, the output
gap under the optimal policy responds to the foreign output gap unless house-
holds have unit elasticity of inter-temporal substitution.
We have also presented a linear quadratic approximation that replicates
the optimal solutions of the original optimal policy problem in the presence
5The optimal relationship between output gap and in°ation under discretion is given by
xt - ¹ xt = - ·
! (¼t - ¹ ¼t).
13of initial price dispersion. Our analysis complements the conventional linear
quadratic approach to the welfare analysis of the monetary policy such as the
work of Woodford (2003). Besides, we demonstrate that when home and for-
eign countries have initial price dispersion, the optimal output gap responds to
the foreign output gap unless households have unit elasticity of inter-temporal
substitution. This result holds true regardless of cost-push shocks in the two
countries. The presence of initial price dispersion can break down the iso-
morphism of the optimal monetary policy problems between open and closed
economies.
Finally, we have seen that optimal policy rules in open and closed economies
are very similar, even though they are not isomorphic. The only di®erence be-
tween optimal policy rules in open and closed economies is that when there
are initial price dispersion and cost-push shock, short-run targets of output
gap and in°ation rate for open economies are not zero and may be a®ected by
foreign output gap. As a result, we can conclude that our results complement
those of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999, 2001, 2002) because our policy rules
mimic their policy rules except for short-run targets.
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16Appendix
A Brief Summary of the Original Economy
We brie°y highlight a two-country open economy version of the sticky price
model with Calvo-type pricing. The preference at period 0 of the household h













where ¯ is the time discount factor, Nt(h) denotes the hours worked by house-
hold h, and Ct is a composite consumption index in per-capita terms. We also
assume that each household h sells di®erentiated labor services to ¯rms, fol-
lowing Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001). The demand for di®erentiated labor






where vt denotes time-varying elasticity of substitution between goods and Nt
is a composite index of hours worked at period t. The composite consumption






where 0 < ° < 1, and CH;t and CF;t are domestic and foreign consumption
goods, respectively. The corresponding consumer price index denoted by Pc;t







where · = (1 ¡ °)1¡°°°, Pt is the producer price index, and PF;t is the price
index of imported goods.
The home country has a population share of (1 ¡ °) and the share of the
foreign country is °. In addition, the consumption and consumer price indices



















17where ` ¤ ' is used to represent quantities and prices in the foreign country.
The representative household maximizes (A.1) subject to the following °ow














1¡vtNt ¡ Tt; (A.6)
where Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor used for computing the value at
period t of a unit of consumption goods at period t + 1, Bt+1 is the nominal
payo® at period t +1 of the portfolio held at period t, Tt is the real lump-sum
tax, Wt is the nominal wage at period t, and ¿ is the subsidy rate at period t
for labor supply. In particular, following the literature, the magnitude of the
subsidy rate in each period will be determined endogenously to eliminate dis-
tortions associated with imperfect competition and openness in goods market,
while the subsidy is funded by lump-sum tax imposed on households.
The ¯rst-order condition for labor supply is given by
N
º


















Moreover, since households in the home and foreign countries have the same
preference over consumption and labor as that described in (A.1), we have
a symmetric set of ¯rst-order conditions from the households of the foreign
country. Under a suitable normalization of initial conditions, the assumption
of complete markets|though a simple asset market with only bonds would




for t = 0, 1, ¢¢¢ 1.
There are two types of domestic goods: intermediate goods and ¯nal goods.
18Domestic intermediate goods are sold only to domestic ¯rms producing ¯nal
goods, while domestic ¯nal goods can be purchased by both domestic and
foreign households. In addition, the markets for ¯nal goods are perfectly com-
petitive and the number of ¯nal goods producers in each country equals its
population size. Moreover, each intermediate goods ¯rm z produces a type z
of intermediate goods indexed in a unit interval [0, 1] and sets its price as a
monopolistic competitor.
Let Yt denote the output level at period t of a ¯nal goods producer. In









where ² > 1 and Yt(z) denotes the demand of a ¯nal goods producer for an
intermediate goods z. Each ¯nal goods producer minimizes its cost of produc-
ing Yt, taking intermediate goods prices as given. The demand curve of each






where Yt(z) is the demand at period t for intermediate goods produced by
¯rm z, Pt(z) denotes the price at period t of the intermediate goods z, and Pt
denotes the price index of the domestic intermediate goods. In addition, the








Having described the behavior of ¯nal goods ¯rms, the analysis turns to
the price setting of intermediate goods ¯rms. Each ¯rm z employs labor to
produce its product z using a linear production function:
Yt(z) = AtNt(z); (A.14)
where Nt(z) is the number of hours hired by ¯rm z and Yt(z) denotes the
output level of the domestic ¯rm z. In addition, the labor market is assumed
to be perfectly competitive and nominal wage is completely °exible.
19Following Calvo (1983) and Yun (1995), a fraction of intermediate goods
producers, 1 ¡ ®, are allowed to choose a new optimal price at period t, P ?
t ,
in each period t = 0, 1, ¢¢¢, 1. In addition, the other fraction of ¯rms do not
change their previous prices. Hence, the Calvo-type staggering allows one to
rewrite the price index de¯nition equation (3.2) as follows:








where ¦t = Pt
Pt¡1 denotes the ratio of domestic producer's price level at period
t to its level at period t ¡ 1.
In addition, the pro¯t-maximization problem under the Calvo-type stag-



















where mct = MCt
Pc;t . The ¯rst-order condition for P ?




































We close the description of the model by considering equilibrium conditions
to obtain a relationship between the aggregate consumption and production
factor input. The aggregate market clearing for domestic and foreign goods,
therefore, can be written as





t = (1 ¡ °)CF;t + °C
¤
F;t: (A.21)
20It is well known that, in our setup of unit elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign goods, the trade balance is zero:










Let St denote the terms of trade at period t of the home country, which is
de¯ned as the ratio of the price index of imported goods to that of exported
goods, i.e. St =
PF;t
Pt . Then, dividing both sides of (A.23) by their corresponding
sides of (A.22) and applying the law of one price to the resulting equation, one
can obtain an expression of the terms of trade in terms of the ratio of the














Ct. Then, combining these two equations results in Ct
= · YtS
¡°
t . Hence, substituting (A.24) into this equation, one can show that
the per capita consumption in the home country is a Cobb-Douglas function







B Linear Quadratic Approximation
B.1 Derivation of our quadratic loss function
In this section, I use the approximation method of Woodford (2003) to derive a
loss function that includes relative price distortion and foreign country's output
gap. But I adopt a di®erent order of approximation to the measure of relative
price distortion than the one used in Woodford (2003). The reason for this is
that the primary concern of this section is to display how one can replicate the
optimal conditions from the optimal policy problem with the original utility
function by solving an optimal policy problem with a quadratic loss function.
Before going further, notice that when either relative price distortion or
cost-push shock or both exist in the foreign country, we have x¤
t 6= 0, where x¤
t




















t denotes the ¯rst-best level of consumption at period t, Xt is the ratio
of the home country's output level to its ¯rst-best level and X¤
t is the ratio
of the foreign country's output level to its ¯rst-best level. In the following, I
focus on second-order Taylor expansions around the steady state with constant
prices, in which C = Co. The second-order Taylor expansion to the utility






1¡¾ + C1¡¾[(1 ¡ °)(Xt ¡ 1) + °(X¤




+(1 ¡ °)f((1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ ¾) ¡ 1)
(Xt¡1)2
2 + (1 ¡ ¾)°(Xt ¡ 1)(X¤




where jj»jj is a bound on the amplitude of exogenous shocks and O(jj»jj3)
denotes the order of approximation residual.
Following Woodford (2003), one can express second-order approximations
to Xt and X¤
t in terms of their logarithmic deviations from their steady state
values as follows:


















where xt (= logXt) and x¤
t (= logX¤
t ) denote output gaps of the home and
foreign countries, respectively, both of which are de¯ned as logarithmic devi-
ations of Xt and X¤
t from their steady state values. Substituting (B.28) into















2 ) + (1 ¡ °)°(1 ¡ ¾)xtx¤
t] + t:i:p: + O(jj»jj3);
1
A (B.29)
where t:i:p: collects terms that are independent of monetary policy of the home
country. Note that t:i:p: includes the part of the home welfare that is a®ected
















At )1+º = N1+Â





2 ) + (1 + º)(Xt ¡ 1)(¢t ¡ 1)] + O(jj»jj3):
!
(B.30)















where ±t (= log¢t) is the logarithm of the measure of relative price distortion.
Note that the order of approximation residual is O(jj±;»jj3) in this paper, while
it is O(jj±
1
2;»jj3) in Woodford (2003).
We now discuss the role of distorting labor income tax or employment sub-
sidy in deriving a quadratic loss function. Note that the marginal rate of




Subtracting (B.31) from (B.29) and then substituting (B.32) into the resulting
equation, we can obtain a quadratic approximation to the instantaneous utility
function of the representative household:








where v = (1 ¡ °)C1¡¾, ut is the instantaneous utility level at period t of
the home country, and ¹ u is its steady state utility level, and ¹ O = O(jj±;»jj3).




















where v¤ = °C¤1¡¾, u¤
t is the instantaneous utility level at period t of the
foreign country and ¹ u¤ is its steady state utility level. Here, note that t:i:p:
includes the part of the foreign country's welfare that depends on the output
gap of the home country:
g
¤(xt) = (1 ¡ °)C
1¡¾(xt +




23Next, I turn to the approximation of the measure of relative price distortion.
A second-order Taylor expansion to equation (3.5) is












Besides, equation (B.35) can be rewritten as











Hence, substituting this equation into (B.35) and rearranging, one can have an
alternative representation of equation (B.35) as follows:






























It follows from (B.37) that a discounted sum of logarithms of relative price


























2(1 ¡ ®¯)(1 ¡ ®2¯)
:
As a result, substituting (B.38) into (B.33), we have the following quadratic


















txt + µ±txtg]; (B.39)
where parameters ­, !, Á, and µ are de¯ned as
­ =
v®²






° + º + °(1 ¡ ¾)
;µ =
(1 + º)!
° + º + °(1 ¡ ¾)
:
(B.40)
































where ­¤ = v¤®¤²





(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ ¾)!¤
° + º + (1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ °)
;µ =
(1 + º)!¤




(1 ¡ ®¤)(1 ¡ ®¤¯)(° + º + (1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ °))
®¤ ; (B.43)
It is now noteworthy that as noted earlier, when either relative price dis-
tortion or cost-push shock or both exist in the foreign country, we have x¤
t 6= 0.
Hence, quadratic loss functions derived above can be those for either the case
where both of cost-push shock and relative price distortion exist or the case
where relative price distortion alone exists.
B.2 The conventional quadratic loss function
Having described how to derive a loss function up to the error of O(jj±;»jj3), we
now move onto the discussion of using errors of order O(jj±
1
2;»jj3) for derivation
of the conventional loss function. This is consistent with the order of approxi-
mation used in Woodford (2003). Besides, we assume that the foreign country
does not achieve its ¯rst-best allocation because of cost-push shocks.
It follows from equations (B.29) and (B.31) that the use of O(jj±
1
2;»jj3) for
a quadratic approximation to the instantaneous utility function leads to










It is clear that if it is assumed that the foreign country achieves the ¯rst-
best allocation, the use of O(jj±
1
2;»jj3) for a quadratic approximation to the
instantaneous utility function leads to








25Comparing (B.45) with (B.44), we can see that cross-product terms between
home and foreign output gaps are included because of the assumption that
cost-push shocks prevent the foreign country from achieving its ¯rst-best allo-
cation, especially when O(jj±
1
2;»jj3) is used as a order of approximation for a
quadratic approximation to the instantaneous utility function. Similarly, the
use of O(jj±
1
2;»jj3) for the utility function of the foreign country leads to
u
¤












Furthermore, a second-order Taylor expansion to equation (3.5) under the
approximation error of O(jj±
1
2;»jj3) turns out to be
























It follows from (B.48) that a discounted sum of logarithms of relative price


















As a result, substituting (B.49) into (B.46), we have the following quadratic
















This is identical to the loss function given in (2.4).




Pc;t in equation (A.7) and then substituting (A.25) into the















Ct with (A.25) and then rearranging the













¹ Pt is the value of
Pc;t
Pt at the ¯rst-best allocation. Hence, taking log-
arithms to both sides of the two equations and then summing the resulting
equations leads to
^ mct + ^ pc;t = ut + º±t + (º + ° + ¾(1 ¡ °))xt ¡ (1 ¡ ¾)°x
¤
t (B.53)
where ut = logUt, ^ mct = mct




¹ Pc;t. Besides, log-linearizing (A.15),
(A.17) (A.18) and (A.19) and then combining the resulting equations, we have
¼t =
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ®¯)
®
(^ mct + ^ pc;t) + ¯Et[¼t+1]: (B.54)
Combining these two equations, we have the following Phillips curve equation:
¼t = ·xt ¡ ¹ ·¹ xt + ¹±t + ut + ¯Et[¼t+1]: (B.55)
Here, it is not di±cult to see that when ±t = 0 is assumed in equation (B.55),
one can have the same Phillips curve equation as (2.6).
C Exact Solution to the Original Optimal Policy Problem in the
Absence of Cost-Push Shock
In this section, we illustrate that when there is not cost-push shock, one can
obtain an analytic solution to the original optimal policy problem without any
approximation. Now, I turn to the optimal policy problem. Let Jn(¢t¡1;Àt)
represent the value function at period t in the Bellman equation for the optimal
policy problem and Àt denote the state vector at period t. Speci¯cally, the



































taking as given an initial value for the measure of relative price distortion ¢¡1,
and state vectors fÀtg1
t=0 including fY ¤
t g1
t=0. The ¯rst-order conditions for this













²¡1 = ¦t¢t¡1; (C.5)







where Át denotes the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint (C.3) in period t.
Having described the ¯rst-order conditions of the optimal monetary policy
problem, one can compute the optimal allocation fCt;Nt;¢tg1
t=0 and the op-
timal producer price in°ation rate f¦tg1
t=0 by solving equations (C.2), (C.3),
(C.4) and (C.5) in each period t = 0, 1, ¢¢¢, 1, given an initial value of ¢¡1
and exogenous variables. But it should be noted that the dynamical system
consisting of two di®erence equations (C.3) and (C.5) is self-su±cient to de-
termine the equilibrium dynamics of the domestic producer price in°ation rate
and measure of relative price distortion from period 0 onward for an appropri-
ately chosen value of ¢¡1. This in turn implies that one can obtain a series of
the optimal in°ation targets without having to solve the entire set of the op-
timality conditions explained above. Speci¯cally, solving equations (C.3) and
(C.5) simultaneously yields a nonlinear solution of the form:





Under the optimal policy, the resulting dynamics for the relative price distortion
is










28It is clear from (C.8) that the absence of the initial price dispersion leads to ¢t
= 1 for t = 1, 2, ¢¢¢, 1. It then follows from (C.9) that the optimal monetary
policy stabilizes the price level completely if the initial price dispersion does not
exist. However, if the initial price dispersion does exist, the optimal monetary
policy allows for a gradual transition of the relative price distortion toward the
steady state with no price dispersion.
29